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ABSTRACT 
Audit committees are a legal requirement for public companies in Canada and Singapore, a 
listing requirement of the New York and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchanges, and a normal 
feature of corporate life in the United States. They are also becoming commonplace in the 
United Kingdom and Australia. Until 1997 they were regarded as a means of strengthening 
external financial reporting; since then they have become valued for fulJilling a broad 
corporate governance role. 
In New Zealand (NZ), there was little interest in audit committees until the I99Os. However, 
stimulated by unexpected corporate failures (often amid malpractice by senior of@cials) in 
the wake of the 1987 sharemarket crash, and a requirement, introduced in I989, for the Chief 
Executive and Chief Financial Officer of most public sector entities to acknowledge in the 
financial statements their responsibility for those statements andfor maintaining an effective 
system of internal control, audit committees are being adopted at a rapid rate. 
Ihis paper reports on a survey designed to ascertain the incidence of audit committees in 
significant private and public sector entities in NZ; the reasons for their adoption; their 
composition, organisation and functions; the attributes required in order for audit 
committees to function effectively; and their perceived advantages and disadvantages. The 
survey found inter alia, that in mid-1993, 61% of both listed companies and significant 
public sector entities in NZ had audit committees; that they are expected to play a broad 
corporate governance role; and that internal and external auditors, corporate chairpersons 
andfinancial statement users all favour these committees. It also found that audit committee 
effectiveness could be improved by (i) ensuring that the committees have clearly defined 
written terms of reference, (ii) routinely providing all relevant parties with minutes of audit 
committee meetings, and (iii) disclosing the existence, membership and functions of audit 
committees in corporate annual reports. 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest in corporate audit committees’ appears particularly appropriate at this time. 
Directors, business executives and business-related professionals are continually being 
held to higher standards of accountability and responsibility . . . The corporate audit 
committee has been suggested as offering significant assistance to a number of groups in 
meeting their business responsibilities . [in particular] non-officer directors, corporate 
executives and independent CPAs. (Mautz and Neumann, 1970, p. 1) 
These observations are as pertinent today as when they were written 27 years ago. Indeed, it 
is surprising to realise that, in 1970, audit committees were “virtually unheard of’ (CICA, 
1981, p.1). Today, they are a legal requirement for public companies in Canada and 
Singapore, a listing requirement of the New York and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchanges, and a 
normal feature of corporate life in the United States (US). Further, encouraged by reports 
such as the Cadbury Report (CFACG, 1992) in the United Kingdom (UK) and the Bosch 
Report (BCA, 199 1) in Australia, which recommend that audit committees be a regulatory 
requirement for all public companies, they are becoming commonplace in the UK and 
Australia. 
A review of relevant literature suggests that, in all of the countries where they have become 
established, audit committees have been stimulated by unexpected company failures and/or 
corporate malpractice. Further, once they begin to gain acceptance, they are established at a 
rapid rate. This was seen, for example, in Canada’ and the US3 in the 197Os, and in the UK4 
and Australia’ in the 1980s. The literature also shows that during the early 1970s audit 
’ An audit committee is defined as a subgroup of an entity’s governing body (board of directors or equivalent) which has 
responsibility for overseeing the entity’s external financial reporting process and/or its internal audit function. 
* Lam and Arens (1975) found that just under 6% of major corporations in Ontario had audit committees prior to 1970 
when the Ontario Business Corporations Act was passed. (This Act requires all public companies incorporated in 
Ontario to establish audit committees). In 1981, a study conducted by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA, 1981) found that 80% of public companies in Canada had audit committees. 
3 
4 
In 1970, Mautz and Neumann (1970) found that 32% of large public companies in the US had audit committees. Six 
years later they found the proportion had increased to 87% (Mautz and Neumann, 1977). 
In 1985, in a survey of the Times Top 1000 industrial companies in the UK, Marrian (1988) found that fewer than 17% 
of his 451 respondents had audit committees. Collier (1992) reported that, in 1991, 66% of UK listed companies 
included in the top 250 industrial firms in the Times 1000, and 88% of Britain’s major financial institutions, had audit 
committees. 
committees were regarded, almost exclusively, as a means of strengthening the external audit 
function and ensuring that external financial reports were reliable. However, since about 1977 
(encouraged by the revelations which led to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977), 
there has been a discernible and increasing shift in their orientation, away from the external 
audit function and external financial reporting towards the internal audit function and more 
general corporate governance matters (Porter, 1993). 
In New Zealand (NZ), until recently, there was little interest in audit committees. In 198 1, 
Chandler (1982) found that about 15% of public listed companies in NZ had audit committees. 
This was not dissimilar from the findings of surveys conducted in the UK and Australia at 
about the same time6. However, in 1989, Lukkassen (1989) found the proportion of NZ 
public listed companies with audit committees had risen only to about 22% - well below the 
levels then pertaining in North America, the UK and Australia. Further, until the NZ Institute 
of Directors recommended the adoption of audit committees in its Code of Proper Practice for 
Directors (IOD, 1993), audit committees were not strongly endorsed in NZ by either relevant 
professional bodies or regulatory agencies. 
Given the experience of other Anglo-American countries, and given the large number of 
unexpected company failures which occurred in NZ in the wake of the 1987 sharemarket 
crash, all too frequently amid allegations of fraud or other malpractice by senior company 
officials, it seemed likely that audit committees would be established rapidly in NZ, at least by 
public listed companies, during the early to mid-1990s. Additionally, under public sector 
legislation, such as the Public Finance Act 1989, the financial statements of all significant 
public sector entities in NZ must be accompanied by a statement signed by the entity’s Chief 
Executive and Chief Financial Offtcer. This must acknowledge the Chief Executive’s 
responsibility for (a) the financial statements and judgements used therein, and (b) establishing 
and maintaining a system of internal control designed to provide reasonable assurance as to the 
integrity and reliability of financial reporting. The statement must also state that, in the 
opinion of the Chief Executive, the financial statements fairly reflect the financial position and 
Surveys by Christoti (1978) and Davison (1984) indicate that in the mid-1980s about 27% of large public listed 
companies in Australia had audit committees. A survey by Ernst & Young in 1990 found that the proportion had 
increased to 66% (Companies and Securities Bulletin, 1990). 
6 See footnotes 4 and 5. 
operations of the entity. Faced by these statutory requirements, Chief Executives need 
assurance that their obligations have been met. Audit committees seem to provide a means to 
meet this need. 
Against this background, research was conducted in NZ in 1993 to ascertain the incidence of 
audit committees in significant private and public sector corporate entities; the reasons for 
their adoption; their composition, administration and functions; the attributes interested parties 
consider necessary for audit committees to function effectively; and the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages of these committees. The research also sought to identifjl differences in the 
audit committees (and attitudes thereto) of private and public sector entities. This paper 
reports the methodology and findings of this research. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to obtain a wide range of views on audit committees in NZ, a mail survey was 
conducted. Four broad groups of respondents were surveyed, namely: 
. external auditors - partners of ‘Big 6’ and ‘middle tier’ firms of chartered 
accountants and senior personnel from Audit New Zealand (NZ’s public sector 
auditors); 
. internal auditors - from both private and public sector entities; 
. chairpersons of the governing bodies of public listed companies and significant public 
sector entities (including Government Departments, Local Authorities, State Owned 
Enterprises, Regional Health Boards and Tertiary Education Institutions); 
l financial statement users - financial analysts, stockbrokers, corporate/commercial 
division bankers and financial journalists. 
The members of each survey group were selected by equal interval random sampling from 
populations identified primarily from lists of names obtained from relevant firms, professional 
organizations and government agencies. As is shown in Figure 1, 540 questionnaires were 
mailed and 364 usable responses were returned (an overall usable response rate of 67%). The 
response rates range from 82% for external auditors to 62% for the corporate entity 
chairpersons. 
Figure 1: Groups included in the survey and their response rates. 
Survey Group’ 
External Auditors 
CA Firms 
Audit New Zealand 
Total 
Internal Auditors 
Private sector entities 
Public sector entities 
Total 
Chairpersons of Corporate Entities 
Private sector 
Public sector 
Total 
Financial Statement Users 
Financial analysts 
Stockbrokers 
Bankers 
Financial Journalists 
Total 
Combined Totals 
No. in Survey 
60 
40 
100 
50 
50 
100 
100 
100 
200 
40 
40 
40 
20 
140 
540 
No. of usable % usable 
responses responses 
44 73 
38 95 
82 82 
38 76 
43 86 
81 81 
52 52 
72 72 
124 62 
18 45 
15 38 
34 85 
10 50 
77 55 
364 67 
The questionnaire was designed to seek information about: 
. the current and planned existence of audit committees; 
. reasons for establishing/not establishing audit committees; 
. membership and administrative aspects of audit committees; 
l the functions of audit committees; 
l disclosures in corporate annual reports relating to audit committees. 
Additionally, respondents’ views were sought regarding: 
. attributes of audit committees and audit committee members which enhance the 
effectiveness of audit committees; 
. arguments advanced in the literature in favour of, and against, audit committees. 
Three versions of the questionnaire were prepared - one for external auditors, another for 
internal auditors and corporate chairpersons, and a third for financial statement users. 
Although differing in detail, the content of the questionnaires was essentially the same. The 
external auditors were asked to respond to questions relating to the existence and functions of 
audit committees in either (a) private or (b) public sector entities, based on their knowledge of 
such committees - obtained from auditing relevant entities. They were also asked to indicate 
the disclosures relating to audit committees they consider should be made in corporate annual 
reports. The internal auditors and corporate chairpersons were asked to provide similar 
information based on the existing situation in their organisation. As there was no overlap in 
the entities represented by the internal auditors and corporate chairpersons, conclusions about 
the current existence, membership, administration and functions of, and disclosures relating to, 
audit committees in private and public sector entities respectively, were derived from the 
average of the responses of the relevant subgroups of these two survey groups. The financial 
statement users were asked to indicate whether knowledge of the existence or absence of an 
audit committee affects their assessment of an entity and/or the reliability of its financial 
statements and also to express their views on the ‘ideal’ composition and functions of audit 
committees and the disclosures about audit committees which should appear in corporate 
annual reports. 
In analysing the survey results, simple t-tests of the differences between the proportions or 
means of the survey groups’ responses were used. A significance level of 0.05 was adopted. 
SURVEY RESULTS 
a) Incidence of, and reasons for establishing/not establishing audit committees 
From Figure 2 it may be seen that, at the time of the survey (mid-1993) approximately 61% of 
public companies and significant public sector entities in NZ had audit committees. The 
proportion was slightly higher in the private than public sector (63% compared to 59%) but 
the difference was not significant. About two-thirds of these committees were established 
during the previous four years and a number of other entities in both sectors planned to 
establish audit committees in the following two years. The youthfilness of audit committees 
in public sector entities was particularly striking. Around 80% of public sector audit 
committees were established in the four years prior to the survey compared with about 50% of 
those in private sector corporates: about 50% of private sector audit committees had been in 
existence for five years or more. 
Regarding the reasons for establishing audit committees, Figure 2 shows that 65% or more of 
each of the broad survey groups signified that the following are important reasons: 
Figure 2: Incidence of, and reasons for establishing/not establishing, audit committees 
No. of respondents rn survey 
r0l4p: 
Existence of audit 
committees 
Respondents from (or who have 
audited) entities with an audit 
committee 
No of years audit committees 
have been established: 
* lesathan2years 
* 2-4years 
* 5 years or more 
Plan to establish audit committee 
in next 12-24 months 
Reasons for establishing 
Regarded as good corporate 
practice 
To facilitate examination of 
entity’s internal controls 
To facilitate effective examination 
of external financial reports 
To strengthen role and 
independence of non-executive 
directors 
To strengthen independence of 
internal auditors 
To monitor compliance with 
entity’s code of conduct 
To strengthen independence of 
external auditors 
Legislation requiring large 
corporates to establish audit 
committees is likely 
To reduce directors’ legal liability 
To comply with requirements of 
overseas Stock Exchange or 
other replator ,---- --------- 
Reasons for not establishing 
Governing body tirltils duties an 
audit committee would 
perform 
Absence of legal requirement for 
an audit committee 
‘Quasi’ audit committee tirlfds 
the Smctions of a formal 
colnmittee 
Costs of an audit committee 
would outweigh its benefit 
Audit committee is not needed as 
entity has no internal audit 
function 
Jnsufficient suitable non-executive 
directors are available to form 
an audit committee 
Corporate culture is not ready for 
an audit committee 
Not appropriate to have audit 
committee at subsidian, , 
company level (or equivalent) 28 7 
1 Respondents were asked to corn! 2 the qua nnaire as : 
External Internal 
Auditors Auditors 
82 81 
%l %= 
vey Groups’ 
corporate 
Chalr- 
persons 
124 
o/ill 
Financial 
Statemenl 
Users 
77 
%I 
it 
Private Public 
Sector Sector 
44 38 
%2 %1 
Private 
Sector 
38 
Public 
%2 
Chair1 
Private 
Sector 
52 
%I 
Public 
Sector 
72 
%l 
77 63 60 N/A 82 87 58 64 67 54 
Majority 
estab. 
about 2 
yew 
80 
entities 
%’ 
18 
49 
33 
20 
25 
38 
37 
N/A 
17 19 
35 62 
48 19 
26 N/A 9 29 
13 37 
36 41 
51 22 
29 24 
%’ %’ 
Majority Majority 
estab. estab. 
2-5 years l-2 years 
26 54 
entities entities 
%’ %’ %’ %3 %’ 
85 86 93 89 88 86 92 81 92 94 
92 94 77 69 88 96 100 90 74 79 
93 69 84 65 93 94 75 63 87 81 
51 36 60 68 65 41 46 28 82 44 
39 76 38 49 35 41 85 69 36 43 
33 64 47 47 40 31 72 57 40 53 
43 40 53 35 38 43 4s 33 64 43 
82 1 6 21 80 71 4 0 6 7 
20 10 19 N/A 15 20 13 7 29 11 
9 ---- 
%3 
12 ---- 
%3 
7 N/A ----- ,----. 
%’ %’ 
17 .---- 
%’ 
0 .---- 
%’ 
22 ---- 
%’ 
3 ---- 
%’ 
14 6 ---- ---- 
%’ %’ 
77 13 63 N/A 82 66 15 IO 93 JO 
61 25 51 N/A 72 47 23 26 60 47 
60 15 42 N/A 64 51 15 15 39 44 
45 8 31 N/A 33 52 8 8 40 27 
46 11 18 N/A 34 
31 
33 
59 
56 4 18 31 
34 6 
34 15 
18 
7 
N/A 
N/A 
37 8 
32 15 
36 
7 
5 N/A 0 12 
5 
15 
3 15 
13 
9 
7 
0 
Broad S iUP External .uditors’ Internal uditors’ lr Corporate sons’ 
. External auditors - based on entities they audit with/without audit committees. 
l Internal auditors and corporate chairpersons - based on the existing situation in their organisation. 
l Financial statement users - based on their opinions. 
2 Percentage of respondents in the survey group responding to the question. 
3 Percentage ofthe survey group signifjring the reason is important in an entity’s decision to establish/not establish audit an committee, 
N/A signifies the survey group was not asked this question. 
1 
. establishing audit committees is regarded as good corporate practice; 
. audit committees are able to facilitate effective examination of the entity’s 
- internal controls, 
- external financial reports. 
Although these reasons were supported strongly by all of the groups, their ranking differed - 
apparently reflecting each group’s understandable bias. While the corporate chairpersons and 
financial statement users identified ‘recognition as good corporate practice’ as a particularly 
important reason, the internal and external auditors gave greater support to ‘facilitating 
effective examination of internal controls’. The internal auditors (particularly those in private 
sector entities) also recognised as important the ability of audit committees to strengthen the 
independence of internal auditors (identified as important by 76% of this group, compared 
with 49% of financial statement users, 39% of external auditors and 38% of corporate 
chairpersons). However, somewhat unexpectedly - given the former role of audit committees 
in strengthening the external audit function - none of the groups identified ‘to strengthen the 
independence of external auditors’ as a particularly important reason for establishing audit 
committees: this was recognised as important by 53O/o of corporate chairpersons, 43% of 
external auditors, 40% of internal auditors and 35% of financial statement users. Of greater 
significance to all of the groups except the internal auditors is the ability of audit committees 
to strengthen the role and independence of non-executive directors (or their equivalent): 68% 
of financial statement users, 60% of corporate chairpersons and 51% of external auditors 
identified this as an important reason. 
The reasons identified by respondents for establishing audit committees in private, compared 
with, public sector entities appear to be broadly similar. However, some marked differences 
are evident. For example, a significantly greater proportion of private than public sector 
external auditors, internal auditors and, in particular, corporate chairpersons, identified 
strengthening the role and independence of non-executive directors as an important reason for 
establishing audit committees. (The private to public sector proportions are 65% to 41% for 
external auditors; 46% to 28% for internal auditors; and 82% to 44% for corporate 
chairpersons: see Figure 2). Given the traditional absence of non-executives on the governing 
bodies of public sector entities and the youthfulness of these entities’ audit committees (which 
generally include non-executives) the disparity in the sector group responses is not difficult to 
understand. However, other differences, and more particularly inconsistencies, in the 
responses are perplexing. For example, the ability of audit committees to monitor compliance 
with the entity’s code of conduct was identified as an important reason for establishing audit 
committees by significantly more private than public sector external and internal auditors (the 
comparative proportions are 40% to 31%, and 72% to 57%, respectively). However, the 
reverse picture is provided by the corporate chairpersons: 53% of those in public sector 
entities identified this as an important reason but only 40% of those in public companies did 
so. Similar differences and inconsistencies are evident in sector group responses relating to 
audit committees’ ability to strengthen the independence of external auditors. While more 
public than private sector external auditors (43% compared to 38%) identified this as an 
important reason for establishing audit committees, the position was reversed in the case of the 
internal auditors and, more particularly, the corporate chairpersons: 33% and 43%, 
respectively, of public sector internal auditors and corporate chairpersons cited this reason as 
important compared with 48% and 64%, respectively, of their private sector counterparts. 
As regards the reasons for entities not establishing audit committees, Figure 2 reveals that the 
survey groups whose views were sought’ identified as important reasons the fact that the full 
governing body or a ‘quasi’ audit committee fulfils the functions normally assigned to audit 
committees, and the absence of a legal requirement for audit committees to be established. In 
relation to the latter, it is pertinent to note that, in answer to another question, all four survey 
groups strongly agreed that there should be such a requirement for companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange and for major public sector entities (see Figure 6). 
Notable features attaching to the reasons for entities not establishing audit committees are the 
small percentage of internal auditors identifying the reasons as important and the disparity in 
the responses of the survey groups. For example, while 34% of the external auditors 
recognised as important the corporate culture not being ready for such a move, only 15% of 
the internal auditors and 7% of the corporate chairpersons did so. Similarly, 45% of the 
external auditors and 3 1% of the corporate chairpersons identified as an important reason, the 
costs of an audit committee outweighing the benefits, but only 8% of the internal auditors 
concurred with this view. 
’ The relevant question was omitted from the financial statement users’ version of the questionnaire. 
Turning attention to differences in the reasons for private and public sector entities not 
establishing audit committees, Figure 2 reveals that the sector group responses are, in general, 
conflicting. All three survey groups indicated that the governing body fulfilling the duties of 
an audit committee, and audit committees not being appropriate at subsidiary company level, 
are more important reasons in private than in public sector entities but, beyond this no general 
conclusions can be drawn. 
b) Composition, administration and disclosure of audit committees 
From Figure 3 it may be seen that the size of audit committees in NZ corporates varies widely 
- from about two to 14 members. However, most commonly, in both private and public sector 
entities, these committees have between four and seven members and include at least one 
executive and three non-executive directors (or their equivalent). This size and composition 
corresponds quite closely with the ‘ideal’ identified by financial statement users. As Figure 3 
shows, members of this group signified that audit committees should have about five members 
and include two executive and two non-executive members. The last finding is surprising. 
Given the perceived value of audit committees in fulfilling a broad corporate governance role, 
and given the recent increase in audit committees in NZ - in an era of unexpected corporate 
failure and alleged misconduct by senior executives - financial statement users might have been 
expected to seek a higher ratio of non-executive to executive directors in their ‘ideal’ audit 
committee. 
With respect to audit committee members, the survey indicates that significantly more Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) than Chief Financial Oficers (CFOs) are members of audit 
committees, especially in the public sector. (CEOs are members of about 75% and 60% of 
audit committees in public and private sector entities, respectively, compared with CFOs who 
are members of about 39% of audit committees in each sector.) The results also indicate that 
more Chief Internal Auditors (CIAs) than external auditors are members of audit committees 
in public sector entities but the reverse applies in the private sector. (CIAs are members of 
about 40% of public sector audit committees but of only about 18% of those in the private 
sector; external auditors are members of about 27% of audit committees in each sector). The 
existing position differs quite markedly from that which financial statement users signified 
should exist: 69% and 55% of this group indicated that CFOs and CIAs, respectively, should 
be audit committee members but only about 45% expressed this view in relation to CEOs and 
Figure 3: Composition, administration, and disclosure of audit committees 
t 
1 
External Auditors Internal Auditors 
Corporate 
I 
Chairpersons 
I 
Private 
Sector I i2E, II 22 I ::z!z 
Broad Survey Groups 
I 1 Corporate 1 Financial 
External Internal 
I 
Chair- Statement 
Auditors Auditors oersons Users 
82 1 81 1 - 124 77 44 1 38 11 38 1 43 Respondents m survey group: 
Membership 
No. of: Executives 
Non-executives 
Total membership: mean 
mode 
range 
Au& wmminee members: 
Chief Executive Officer 
Chief Financial Off&r 
External auditor 
Chief Intcmal Auditor 
If not members can attend 
meetings: 
External auditor 
Chief Internal auditor 
Chief Executive officer 
Chief Financial Officer 
Audit wmmiftee membership 
debarred iJ 
Substantial amount of entity’s 
shares or loan stock held 
Some of entity’s shares or loan 
stock held 
Hold particular position in entity 
(eg chairperson) 
An executive in entity/related 
entity 
Lack financial, accounting or 
auditing knowledge 
Means of appointmenz: 
Executives by: 
Governing body 
Chairperson of governing body 
Committee of governing body 
Rotation or automatic 
appointment by position 
Non-Executives by: 
Goveming body 
Chairperson of governing body 
Committee of governing body 
Rotation or automatic 
appointment by position 
Term of appointment 
1-2 years 
3 years 
4Ye=s 
No specified time 
Meetings: Regular meetings 
Mean 
Range 
Special meetings: Mean 
Range 
Minutes of Matings 
Reduced 
Circulated to: 
Audit committee members 
Full governing body 
External auditors 
Chief internal auditor 
Senior executives 
Those attending the meeting 
Means of spec$Gng audit 
committee responribilitiea 
written terms of reference 
Resolutions of goveming body 
Informal agreement 
MO 
N/A 
N/A 
commonJ bxu?7ing re.l wes 
1, 2, or 3 1 2 
3 3 2 
6.0 4.6 4.7 
5 3 5 
3-14 2-11 3-8 
ol A %’ - % 
72 65 44 
37 41 69 
30 23 45 
43 14 55 
94 
93 
80 
88 
NIA N/A N/A 
2 
0 
2 
15 
0 
69 
I2 
36 
16 
51 
33 
13 
10 
N/A N/A N/A 
38 
56 
14 
9 
N/A N/A N/A 
19 
100 
77 
100 
98 
0 
0 
0 
21 
10 
66 
IO 
2 
22 
77 
11 
3 
9 
5 5 
18 7 
0 1 
77 87 
Meon’ Mean’ 
4.4 3.7 
1-9 1-9 
1.9 2.2 
l-4 O-5 
- % %’ 
91 86 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
100 93 
65 36 
64 69 
83 53 
29 37 
75 72 
- % %’ 
N/A N/A N/A 
55 43 
22 28 
14 27 
90 
57 
N/A 
Most 
N/A 
N/A N/A 
N/A N/A 
vimonly a wring re 
1 4 
3 2 
6.2 5.8 
5 6 
3-14 3-12 
I % I % 
64 79 
42 32 
23 38 
32 55 
wps 
1 
3 
4.4 
3 
3-9 
7 
57 
32 
25 
3 
1 
2 
4.8 
4 
2-11 
I % 
72 
49 
21 
24 
94 93 100 100 
93 92 82 75 
89 71 100 100 
89 90 96 100 
5 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
26 4 34 5 
0 0 9 11 
35 32 84 53 
5 18 8 12 
20 4 0 3 
30 43 8 32 
48 65 82 72 
18 10 11 11 
13 5 2 3 
22 15 5 14 
5 4 3 7 
24 13 0 14 
0 0 0 4 
71 83 97 75 
Mean* Mean’ Mean’ Meat? 
3.4 5.3 3.2 4.2 
2-6 1-9 l-9 1-9 
1.3 3.5 2.6 2.0 
1-2 3-4 1-3 O-5 
- % 7 7 7 
100 83 88 85 
100 100 100 87 
59 71 90 66 
57 73 87 55 
67 100 58 48 
11 47 30 41 
67 84 83 62 
- % % 1 % 1 % I 
59 50 41 46 
22 22 25 30 
13 I6 34 20 
Cont . . . 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
NIA 
N/A 
N/A NIA N/A 
Broad S 
Respondents in survey group: 1 82 1 8 1 
Di.~&swcs in annual repod 1 % ’ % ’ 
1 Percentage of respondents in survey group responding to tt : question. 
2 Average of responses 
3 Internal auditors and corporate chairpersons indicated the disclosures which are made in their entity’s annual report; emal auditors and financial statement usen 
indicated the disclosures they considered should be made. 
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external auditors. Given the accepted importance of audit committees in strengthening the 
external financial reporting process, the financial statement users’ responses are surprising: it 
might be expected that a significantly smaller proportion would support CFOs being audit 
committee members but a larger proportion would consider external auditors should be 
members. 
A further disparity between the existing and desired situation in major NZ corporates (as 
reported by the internal auditors and corporate chairpersons on the one hand and financial 
statement users on the other) is evident in relation to reasons for debarring audit committee 
membership. As Figure 3 reveals, the only reason of significance which currently debars 
membership is being an executive in the entity or a related entity. (This applies in about 30% 
of public companies and 4% to 5% of public sector entities). A secondary reason, reported by 
about 10% of corporate chairpersons, is that of a lack of financial, accounting or auditing 
knowledge. However, 51% of financial statement users considered the latter reason should 
debar audit committee membership. Financial statement users were even more agreed that 
holding a substantial amount of the entity’s shares or loan stock should preclude membership 
of the entity’s audit committee: 69% expressed this view. Two percent of internal auditors (all 
from private sector entities) and no corporate chairpersons reported that membership is, in 
fact, debarred for this reason. Thirty six percent of financial statement users also signified that 
holding certain positions within the entity (eg Chairperson) should preclude audit committee 
membership. 
Regarding members’ appointment to an audit committee, the survey indicates that in most 
cases appointment is for an unspecified period. Where appointment is for a limited term, three 
years is the most usual. The most common means of appointment of both executive and non- 
executive members (especially executive members in private sector entities) is by the full 
governing body. The next most common method (particularly for executive members in public 
sector entities) is by rotation or by virtue of position (that is, by automatic appointment). 
With respect to audit committee meetings, the survey indicates that most committees hold 
about four regular and two special meetings a year but some meet as infrequently as once a 
year whilst others meet about once a month. In general, audit committees in public sector 
entities tend to meet a little more frequently than those in private sector entities (see Figure 3). 
In some 90% of cases (with a slightly higher frequency in the private than public sector) 
minutes of meetings are taken and these are circulated to audit committee members in virtually 
all entities. However, the minutes are circulated to all meeting attendees in only about 73% of 
cases and to the full governing body, external auditors and senior executives in about 50%, 
66% and 33% of entities, respectively. It is noted below that one of the arguments cited 
against audit committees is that they can create conflict within an entity. This arises, in 
particular, when senior executives, auditors (internal and external) and others believe that 
matters concerning them are discussed at audit committee meetings when they are not present 
to defend themselves. It is submitted that, if audit committee meeting minutes were 
distributed routinely to all interested parties, much of the potential suspicion - and resultant 
conflict - could be avoided. 
As regards specifying audit committees’ responsibilities, it appears that only about 50% of 
audit committees have written terms of reference. In about 25% of cases, their responsibilities 
are defined by resolutions of the governing body but the duties of some 20% of committees 
are arranged through informal agreement. The responses of the financial statement users 
suggest that, to them, the status quo is not satisfactory. Ninety percent of this group 
expressed the view that audit committees’ responsibilities should be defined in written terms of 
reference and 57% indicated that they should be specified by resolutions of the governing 
body. (It is clear that a significant number of this survey group believe that audit committee 
responsibilities should be determined by resolutions of the governing body and then 
incorporated in written terms of reference). 
The survey results suggest that only minimal disclosures about audit committees are made in 
corporate annual reports but rather more public than private sector entities disclose such 
information. Overall, about 20% of entities disclose the existence of their audit committee, 
about 10% ident@ their audit committee members, 5% disclose the members’ qualifications 
and around 8% or 9% disclose their audit committee’s objectives and/or tinctions (see Figure 
3). The responses of the external auditors and financial statement users suggest that this level 
of disclosure is not satisfactory. Ninety six percent of financial statement users and 6 1% of 
external auditors indicated that the existence of an audit committee should be disclosed; 76% 
of users and 51% of external auditors expressed the same view in respect of the identity of 
audit committee members; and 79% of users and 53% of external auditors indicated that the 
audit committee’s objectives should be reported. In view of the finding that some 80% of 
financial statement users have increased confidence in the reliability of financial information if 
they are aware that an entity has an audit committee (see Figure 6), it is suggested that greater 
disclosure about audit committees in corporate annual reports would be beneficial for both 
financial statement users and the corporate entities concerned. 
c) Functions of audit committees 
As part of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate in relation to (i) external financial 
reporting, (ii) external auditing, (iii) internal auditing, and (iv) other matters, the tinctions 
audit committees perform or, in the case of financial statement users, the fimctions they should 
perform. The results are presented in Figure 4a. Respondents were also asked to indicate, for 
each group of functions, (a) the most and (b) the least important Cmction. The number of 
‘least important’ responses for each function was deducted from the number of ‘most 
important’ responses to generate a ‘net importance’ figure. This, in the form of a percentage, 
provided a weighted ranking for each audit committee function. These are presented in Figure 
4b. The closer a ranking is to +lOO (-loo), the more important (unimportant) the group 
considered the tinction to be. 
(i) Externalfinancial reporting: All four broad survey groups indicated that particularly 
important external financial reporting functions of audit committees are: 
. reviewing the entity’s audited financial statements; 
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. reviewing the accounting policies used in preparing the financial statements and any 
changes in the policies; 
. monitoring compliance with statutory requirements; 
. reviewing the entity’s entire annual report. 
The internal and external auditors and corporate chairpersons indicated that at least 65% of 
audit committees perform these functions and 86% or more of the financial statement users 
signified that the functions should be performed by audit committees. 
Looking at differences in the external financial reporting functions performed by audit 
committees in private and public sector entities, the internal auditors indicated that each 
function is performed by significantly more audit committees in private than public sector 
entities. The difference is particularly marked in respect of audit committees reviewing public 
statements on financial matters prior to their release and reviewing circulars relating to non- 
routine transactions such as takeover bids. The performance of these functions was reported 
by 46% and 35%, respectively, of internal auditors of private sector entities compared to 0% 
in each case by their public sector counterparts. Unlike the internal auditors, the externai 
auditors and, more particularly, the corporate chairpersons signified that there is little 
difference in the functions performed by private and public sector audit committees. The most 
significant difference signalled by these groups pertains to audit committees reviewing 
statements on financial matters prior to their release: 55% and 71%, respectively, of corporate 
chairpersons and external auditors of private sector entities reported this f?mction is 
performed, compared with 9% and 37%, respectively, of those of public sector entities (see 
Figure 4a). 
As regards the most and least important external financial reporting tinction performed by 
audit committees, Figure 4b reveals that the external auditors, internal auditors and financial 
statement users all considered reviewing the entity’s audited financial statements to be the 
most important function. However, the financial statement users adjudged reviewing the 
accounting policies adopted by the entity to be equally important, and this function was 
considered to be the most important by the corporate chairpersons. At the other end of the 
spectrum, all four survey groups identified reviewing circulars relating to non-routine 
transactions such as takeover bids as the least important function. 
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(ii) External auditing: As Figure 4a shows, the functions most commonly performed by 
audit committees in relation to external auditing are: 
l discussing with the external auditor the conduct of the audit and any problems 
encountered; 
. reviewing the external auditor’s evaluation of the entity’s internal controls and 
related recommendations for improvement; 
. reviewing management’s response to the external auditor’s recommendations with 
respect to internal controls. 
More than 90% of the external auditors and corporate chairpersons and more than 80% of the 
internal auditors, reported that audit committees perform these functions. Additionally, more 
than 90% of financial statement users indicated that these functions should be performed by 
audit committees. 
While the groups displayed significant agreement in relation to the functions noted above, a 
marked disparity is evident in relation to the other external audit functions. For example, 87% 
of financial statement users considered that audit committees should review the independence 
of external auditors but only 48% of external auditors and 58% of internal auditors and 
corporate chairpersons reported that audit committees perform this function. Along similar 
lines, only 47% of financial statement users signified that audit committees should review the 
proposed audit fee, yet 85% of external auditors, 74% of internal auditors and 61% of 
corporate chairpersons indicated that this function is performed. 
Comparing the external audit functions performed by audit committees in private and public 
sector entities, Figure 4a suggests that, in general, the functions are performed more 
commonly by audit committees in the private sector. However, the external auditors and 
corporate chairpersons (unlike the internal auditors) indicated that more public than private 
sector audit committees review management’s response to the external auditor’s internal 
control recommendations. The external auditors also indicated that the functions of discussing 
the scope and timing of the audit with the external auditor, reviewing the proposed audit fee, 
and arbitrating in disputes between management and the external auditor, are more commonly 
performed by audit committees in public than private sector entities. 
As regards the most important external audit function performed by audit committees, the 
external auditors and corporate chairpersons signified that it is discussing with the external 
auditor the conduct of the audit and any problems encountered; to the internal auditors and 
financial statement users it is reviewing the external auditor’s evaluation of the entity’s internal 
’ controls and related recommendations. It is suggested that these differences reflect the 
differing biases of the survey groups: it might be expected that, while the internal auditors and 
financial statement users are primarily concerned with the ability of the entity’s internal 
controls to prevent and/or detect errors and irregularities, the external auditors and corporate 
chairpersons are more concerned with the ability of the auditors to perform their duties 
effectively and efftciently. 
With respect to the least important external audit function performed by audit committees, the 
external and internal auditors considered it to be nominating the external auditor. However, 
the financial statements users and corporate chairpersons identified it, respectively, as 
reviewing the proposed audit fee and arbitrating in disputes between management and the 
external auditor. The last finding is surprising as it might be anticipated that corporate 
chairpersons would welcome a means, such as the audit committee arbitrating in disputes 
between management and auditors, to ensure that at least a sub-committee of the governing 
body was kept informed of serious disputes arising between these parties. 
(iii) Internal audit: From Figure 4a it may be seen that the survey groups indicated that 
audit committees commonly perform five internal audit related functions, namely: 
l discussing with the Chief Internal Auditor (CIA): 
- the internal audit findings and reports; 
- the effectiveness of the entity’s internal controls; 
- problems encountered in performing internal audit duties; 
. reviewing management’s response to the internal auditors’ recommendations; 
. reviewing the internal audit function’s objectives and plans. 
The corporate chairperson’s responses suggest that these functions are performed by some 
60% to 68% of audit committees, however, the internal and external auditors indicate the 
figure is in the region of 80% to 95%. It is suggested that the latter finding may be more 
reliable as the corporate chairpersons are likely to be less aware than the auditors of the 
relationship between the entity’s internal audit function and audit committee. It is pertinent to 
note that at least 93% of the financial statement users signified that each of these tinctions 
should be performed by audit committees. This seems to reflect a desire by this group for 
audit committees to be concerned with broad corporate governance matters. 
An interesting finding of the survey is the similarity of the internal audit related functions 
performed by audit committees in private and public sector entities. As may be seen from 
Figure 4a, unlike the tinctions in the other groupings, there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of audit committees in private and public sector entities performing the functions 
related to internal audit. 
Considering the most and least important fimctions performed by audit committees in the 
internal audit arena, the external and internal auditors identified the most important function as 
‘discussing with the CIA the internal audit findings and reports’. However, the corporate 
chairpersons and financial statement users indicated that it is discussing with the CIA the 
effectiveness of the entity’s internal controls (see Figure 4bj. For the external auditors and 
financial statement users this finding is consistent with the most important fLnction the group 
identified in relation to external audits. However, for the internal auditors and corporate 
chairpersons it reflects a different stance from that adopted in relation to external audits.’ It 
may be that the internal auditors, like the external auditors, look to the audit committee to 
ensure they are able to discharge their duties effectively and efficiently and they believe that 
discussing the audit findings and reports with the audit committee helps to achieve this 
objective. However, the corporate chairpersons may rely on the internal audit tinction to 
ensure the entity’s internal controls are operating effectively to prevent and/or detect errors 
and irregularities. Thus, they consider the audit committee discussing with the CIA the 
effectiveness of these controls is more important than the committee discussing the internal 
audit findings and reports as a whole. 
As regards the least important internal audit related tinction performed by audit committees, 
all of the survey groups, other than the internal auditors, identified this as evaluating the 
* As noted earlier, the external auditors and corporate cliairpersons considered the most important external audit related 
function performed by audit committees is discussing with the auditor the conduct and problems of the audit; for the 
internal auditors and financial statement users it is reviewing the external auditor’s internal control evaluation and 
related recommendations. 
adequacy of resources allocated to internal audit. The internal auditors considered it to be 
appointing the CIA (see Figure 4b). The latter finding is surprising as it might be expected 
that internal auditors would perceive the appointment of the CIA by the audit committee 
(rather than by the CEO or other executives) as strengthening the independence and role of 
the internal audit function. 
(iv) Other functions: Other important audit committee functions identified by the survey 
groups include: 
. initiating special projects or investigations within the committee’s terms of 
reference.g 
. enquiring into illegal or unethical activities within the entity; 
. reviewing the adequacy of management information systems. 
Figure 4a shows that although these functions are performed by around 60% to 75% of audit 
committees they are not performed as commonly as many of the external financial reporting 
and external and internal audit related functions. 
Looking at differences in the ‘other functions’ performed by audit committees in private and 
public sector entities, the functions of initiating special projects or investigations and reviewing 
the adequacy of management information systems are performed more commonly by public 
than private sector audit committees (see Figure 4a). However, as for the other functional 
groupings, the survey groups’ responses do not portray a consistent picture and, apart from 
the two functions mentioned above, it appears that there is little difference in the ‘other 
functions’ performed by audit committees in the two sectors. 
According to all of the survey groups, other than the financial statement users, the most 
important ‘other function’ performed by audit committees is reviewing the adequacy of 
management’s information systems. This function was ranked highly by the financial 
statement users but they considered enquiring into illegal or unethical activities within the 
entity to be of greater importance. The corporate chairpersons also ranked this, together with 
the function noted above, as ‘the most important’ function. The importance accorded 
’ This function was not included in the financial statement users’ version of the questionnaire as it was envisaged they 
would not have knowledge of the nature of special projects and investigations likely to be initiated by audit 
committees. 
‘enquiring into illegal or unethical activities’ by the financial statement users and corporate 
chairpersons lends support to the conclusion noted earlier, that these groups look to audit 
committees to be concerned with corporate governance matters. 
The survey groups were unanimous in ranking ‘reviewing the entity’s efforts to comply with 
its social obligations to employees, the local community and others’ as the least important 
function of audit committees in this general area. 
(d) Effectiveness of audit committees 
One of the objectives of the survey was to ascertain respondents’ views on the attributes of 
audit committee members and audit committees per se which help to ensure, or enhance, the 
effectiveness of audit committees. In order to achieve this objective, respondents were asked 
to select from suggested attributes relating to (a) audit committee members and (b) audit 
committees, the attribute they considered to be (i) the most and (ii) the least important in 
ensuring the success of an audit committee. To obtain a single measure of the perceived 
importance of each attribute, its weighted rank was calculated in the same manner as the 
weighted rank of audit committee functions: the number of ‘least important’ responses was 
deducted from the number of ‘most important’ responses. The resultant ‘net importance’ 
figure, expressed as a percentage, provided each attribute’s weighted rank. These are 
presented in Figure 5. 
(i) Attributes of audit committee members: Figure 5(a) reveals that all of the survey 
groups other than the external auditors considered the two most important attributes for audit 
committee members to possess are: 
. a full understanding of the purpose and responsibilities of the audit committee; 
l the ability to exercise sound judgement. 
The external auditors concurred with the other groups regarding the importance of audit 
committee members understanding the purpose and responsibilities of the committee but, 
perhaps surprisingly, they considered independence from management to be a more important 
attribute than the ability to exercise sound judgement. The corporate chairpersons rated the 
latter attribute particularly highly (with a weighted ranking of +36) but the internal auditors 
Figure 5: Effectiveness of audit committees: weighted rankings’ of desired attributes of 
(a) audit committee members and (b) audit committees 
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ranked it in joint second place (with a weighted ranking of +16) along with ‘knowledge of the 
entity’s business’. 
At the opposite end of the scale, the external auditors and corporate chairpersons identified 
knowledge of auditing practice as the least important attribute of audit committee members. 
These groups may believe that knowledge of auditing practice can be left to the auditors and 
that audit committee members can seek information or explanations about audit matters 
should they need it. The internal auditors and financial statement users indicated, respectively, 
that possessing knowledge of accounting practice and having experience at governing body or 
senior management level in a range of business areas are the least important attributes. 
Analysis of Figure 5(a) reveals that, although there is a disparity in the weightings given by the 
broad survey groups to the various attributes of audit committee members, the groups are 
generally agreed as to the attributes’ ranking. However, marked (but inconsistent) differences 
of opinion are evident between the public and private sector subgroups. For example, the 
external auditors of private sector entities ranked the attribute ‘being independent of 
management’ in first place (with a weighted ranking of +35) but their public sector entity 
counterparts placed it fifth (with a weighted ranking of 0). These rankings are significantly 
different but the internal auditors and corporate chairpersons in both private and public sector 
entities ranked the attribute in fourth or fifth place (with weighted rankings ranging from 0 to 
+5). Similarly, while the internal auditors in private sector entities considered ‘possessing 
knowledge of the entity’s business’ to be the most important attribute (giving it a weighted 
ranking of +29), those in public sector entities placed it sixth (with a weighted ranking of -4). 
In contrast to this, the external auditors in public sector entities and corporate chairpersons in 
both private and public sector entities ranked this attribute in third place (with weighted 
rankings of +8 to +13) and the external auditors in private sector entities placed it fifth (with a 
weighted ranking of +5). 
(ii) Attributes of audit committees: The broad survey groups were generally agreed about 
the most and least important attributes which audit committees per se need to possess in order 
to ensure their effectiveness. All of the groups, other than the financial statement users, 
considered the most important attribute is having the committee’s objectives and 
responsibilities clearly defined in a written statement. Given the finding (noted earlier) that 
only about 50% of audit committees in major NZ corporates have their responsibilities 
specified in written terms of reference, this result is of particular significance and suggests a 
means of increasing audit committee effectiveness. 
To the financial statement users, the attribute of prime importance for audit committee 
effectiveness is having ready access to relevant information. (They gave this a weighted 
ranking of +27). The corporate chairpersons ranked this attribute in second place (with a 
weighted ranking of +13) but the internal and external auditors placed it seventh and eighth 
(with weighted rankings of +4 and +S), respectively. The external auditors ranked the 
attribute of the chairperson being enthusiastic about the committee’s role within the entity in 
equal first place. However, the other groups gave it a relatively small weighted ranking (+7 by 
the internal auditors, +l by the corporate chairpersons, 0 by the financial statement users, 
compared to +19 by the external auditors) (see Figure 5b). Other attributes the groups 
considered to be important for ensuring audit committee effectiveness include: 
= being supported by senior management (ranked second by the internal auditors); 
l being notified promptly by internal and external auditors of problems encountered 
(ranked in second place, along with having access to relevant information, by the 
corporate chairpersons); 
l being independent of the full governing body (ranked second by the financial statement 
users). 
Regarding the least important attribute of audit committees, all of the survey groups 
considered this to be rotating audit committee membership amongst members of the entity’s 
governing body. To the external and internal auditors and corporate chairpersons, the second 
least important attribute is having continuity of audit committee membership; to the financial 
statement users it is having non-members attend committee meetings as required. All four 
survey groups also considered having agenda and related material provided to members ahead 
of committee meetings to be a relatively unimportant attribute (see Figure 5b). This is 
surprising as it might be expected that audit committee members could discuss issues more 
effectively if they had time to read and consider relevant information prior to meetings. This 
seems to apply, in particular, to non-executive director (or equivalent) members of audit 
committees who could benefit from having the opportunity to identify, prior to the meeting, 
matters on which they need further information before forming a judgement or expressing an 
opinion. 
Regarding differences in the relative importance of attributes pertaining to audit committee 
effectiveness in private and public sector entities, Figure 5b reveals that, as for the attributes 
which are pertinent to the effectiveness of audit committee members, no uniform picture is 
portrayed. For example, the external auditors of private sector entities considered the most 
important attribute to be the chairperson being enthusiastic about the audit committee’s role 
within the entity. The external auditors of public sector entities ranked this attribute in second 
place but gave it a weighted ranking of +l 1 compared to +26 given by their private sector 
counterparts. Unlike the external auditors, the internal auditors of private sector entities 
placed the attribute sixth (with a weighted ranking of +3) compared to their colleagues in 
public sector entities which ranked it fourth (with a weighted ranking of +12). The 
chairpersons of private sector corporates regarded the attribute as of some importance 
(ranking it fourth with a weighted ranking of +9) but those of public sector entities considered 
it to be relatively unimportant - placing it twelfth with a weighted ranking of -4. 
e) Perceived advantages and disadvantages of audit committees 
As part of the survey, respondents were asked to signi@ (on a five point Likert scale) their 
agreement or disagreement with a series of statements which enshrined arguments advanced in 
the literature in support of, and against, audit committees. The means of the survey group 
responses are presented in Figure 6. The closer the means are to 5.0, the greater the 
agreement of the group with the relevant statement: the closer they are to 1.0, the more 
strongly the group disagreed with the statement. 
From Figure 6 it may be seen that the opinions of the survey groups are very similar and that, 
in general, the respondents are very supportive of audit committees. They signified particular 
agreement with the statements that audit committees: 
. assist internal and external auditors report to the entity’s governing body serious 
deficiencies in internal controls and serious management weaknesses; 
Figure 6: Perceived advantages and disadvantages of audit committees 
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From the opposite perspective, respondents disagreed strongly with the assertions that audit 
committees: 
. are merely an additional layer of bureaucracy; 
. are generally ineffective; 
. create a barrier between the entities’ governing body and external auditors. 
Respondents, especially internal auditors in private sector entities, also signified their support 
for audit committees by agreeing strongly with the statement that audit committees should be 
a legal requirement for listed companies and major public sector entities. Further, 80% of the 
financial statement users indicated that if they know an entity has an audit committee it 
increases their confidence in the reliability of the financial information (see Figure 6). 
CONCLUSION 
Experience in Canada, the US, UK and Australia (as elsewhere) suggests that, faced by 
unexpected corporate failures and instances of corporate malpractice, the attention of 
regulators, relevant professional bodies, and significant players in the corporate arena focuses 
on audit committees as a means of reducing corporate ills. Once these committees begin to be 
established, awareness of their potential for securing reliable financial reports and responsible 
corporate governance grows quickly and their adoption proceeds at a rapid rate. 
NZ experienced a significant increase in unexpected company failures, often accompanied by 
reports of corporate malpractice, in the wake of the 1987 sharemarket crash. Added to this, in 
1989, public sector legislation introduced a requirement for the CEO and CFO of all 
significant public sector entities to acknowledge in their entity’s external financial statements 
their responsibility for those statements and for ensuring their entity has an effective system of 
internal control. Given this background, it could be expected that audit committees would be 
established rapidly in significant private and public sector entities in NZ in the early to mid- 
1990s. 
The mail survey conducted in mid-1993 in NZ found that approximately 61% of public listed 
companies and significant public sector entities had audit committees. Many of these 
committees had been established since 1989 and plans were in place for further audit 
committees to be established. The youthfulness of public sector organisations’ audit 
committees was particularly marked. The survey also found that audit committees in NZ, like 
those in other Anglo-American countries, have a variety of functions and, in general, they are 
expected to f?..rlfil a broad corporate governance role. 
The survey results further indicate that external and internal auditors, corporate chairpersons 
and financial statement users are favourably disposed towards audit committees. However, 
the survey responses also suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees could be 
improved if governing bodies ensure that: 
i) the objectives and responsibilities of their entity’s audit committee are clearly defined 
in a written statement; 
ii) all relevant parties (including senior executives) routinely receive the minutes of audit 
committee meetings; and 
iii) information about the existence, membership and functions of the audit committee is 
disclosed in their entity’s annual report. 
The survey findings support the evidence from Canada, the US, UK and Australia which 
indicates that a properly constituted audit committee, with realistic, clearly defined duties, is 
invaluable in helping both private and public sector entities secure reliable external financial 
reporting and responsible corporate governance. However, although audit committees can 
and do assist corporate entities meet the public’s expectations with respect to external 
financial reporting and corporate governance, too much must not be expected of them. When 
circumstances arise which encourage assignment of additional responsibilities to an entity’s 
audit committee, consideration needs to be given to the relationship between those 
responsibilities and the committee’s terms of reference, and to the time and expertise 
committee members are able to devote to the committee’s affairs. Audit committees are not, 
and cannot be, a panacea. 
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